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Abstract The ultimate target of Modelling and Simulation (M&S) activities in the
ﬁeld of CIP is to provide Models, Methodologies and tools to help in the analysis of
different crisis’ scenarios and, subsequently, in crisis management decision making.
A CIs’ disruptions scenario is simply a sequence of random events following a
well-deﬁned chronological order. Generally, each identiﬁed scenario produces a set
of consequences which is a function of: the initiating event, the concerned CIs and
the geo-organizational context of the disrupted CIs. Formal sciences represent the
reality of our surrounding world. But formal sciences are imperfect and what we
call “reality” is the projection of the inaccessible “Reality” on our world. This
projection is the only reality we are talking about in formal sciences. Subsequently,
formal sciences construct objects in which small parts of the sensible reality are
grasped and formalized. These objects can be called “models”. We are limiting our
interest here to formal sciences and engineering activities that cover both concep-
tual and phenomenological modelling processes. Models are ﬁrst validated before
being admitted in the construction of a global model of the sensible reality.
Regarding our focus on crisis scenarios modelling, simulation and analysis
(MS&A), engineers’ ambition is to simulate not only independent isolated phe-
nomenon but also interacting multi-physic multi-scale phenomenon.
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The ultimate target of Modelling and Simulation (M&S) activities in the ﬁeld of
CIP is to provide Models, Methodologies and tools to help in the analysis of
different crisis’ scenarios and, subsequently, in crisis management decision making.
A CIs’ disruption scenario is simply a sequence of events following a
well-deﬁned chronological order. Generally, each identiﬁed scenario produces a set
of consequences which is a function of: the initiating event, the concerned CIs and
the geo-organizational context of the disrupted CIs. If these consequences represent
a signiﬁcant risk to the citizen safety, society security and or governance continuity,
one will talk about a crisis.
The assessment of the consequences of each potential or active scenario of CIs’
disruptions results in fundamental pieces of information for robust crisis manage-
ment and decision making processes.
Having stated the fundamental importance of scenarios assessments, it will be
necessary to highlight the major aspects of scenarios simulation and analysis.
2 Scenarios Simulation
The terms “modelling” and “simulation” are differently perceived by the public
depending on the ﬁeld of science, the topic and the context of use.
Formal sciences ultimate target is to represent the reality of our surrounding
world. Many philosophers and scientists believe that the reality revealed by science
describes only a “veiled” view of an underlying reality that Science can not access.
This belief is mainly because of two reasons: formal sciences are imperfect and
what we call “reality” is the projection of the inaccessible “Reality” on our world.
This projection is the only reality we are talking about in formal sciences. Let’s put
it in that way: Models and simulation can never reproduce the real “reality”. More
interesting points of views may be found in [1, 2].
Subsequently, formal sciences construct objects in which small parts of the
sensible reality are grasped and formalized. These objects can be called “models”.
We are limiting our interest only to formal sciences and engineering. That covers
both conceptual and phenomenological modelling processes. Models are ﬁrst val-
idated before being admitted in the construction of a global model of the sensible
reality.
Regarding our focus on crisis scenarios modelling, simulation and analysis
(MS&A), engineers’ ambition is to simulate not only independent isolated phe-
nomena but also interacting multi-physic multi-scale phenomena.
The simulation of well-deﬁned sequences of events in the case of major crises is
of great help in:
• Decision making in order to elaborate the best strategies in managing crises and
severe accidents.
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• Helping operators to prioritize actions in real situation facing systems’ primary
disruptions and their propagation.
• Helping designers to improve systems’ design in view of minimizing disrup-
tions’ frequency, disruptions propagation and consequent hazards.
• Training future technical staffs and qualiﬁed persons who will be engaged in
systems design, systems operation and crisis management.
Developing powerful integrated simulation capabilities is a serious challenge to
all scientists and engineers in the ﬁeld of CIP. This ambition gives birth to two
major challenges:
• Developing and validating models considering CIs vulnerability to threats and
CIs mutual dependencies.
• Integrating stochastic phenomena in a global coupled modelling process.
We should then understand the disruption of critical infrastructures under the
action of a threat, the dependence between CIs disruptions, disruption propagation
and their dynamic characteristics.
Towards the understanding of the CIs’ disruptions MS&A, let’s start by intro-
ducing the different types of models.
2.1 Types of Models
Formal sciences recognize four types of models: conceptual, empirical-statistical,
logical and qualitative-descriptive models. Brief examples are given in the
following.
Conceptual models occupy a large place in formal science R&D activities and
cover all domains of scientiﬁc investigations, e.g. in:
• Continuum mechanics => Cauchy stress tensor
• Fluid Mechanics => Navier-Stockes Equations
• Heat Transfer => Newton Model
• Material point movement => Newton 3 laws of movement
• Electro-magnetism => Maxwell Equations
• Electrical Circuits => Kirchhoff’s Law
• Structure Dynamic => Lagrange’s Equations of Motion
• Neutron transports => Boltzmann Equation.
Empirical and statistical models occupy also an important place in formal sci-
ences R&D activities and cover domains such as:
• Rains => Rains flow, distribution and frequencies
• Wind => Wind velocity, direction and frequencies
• Volcano eruptions => Frequencies, released energy and matters
• Fluids mech. => Loss of pressure in Pipes and bents
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• Heat transfer => Radiative heat transfer (Stefan’s Law)
• Thermodynamics => Enthalpy and Entropy (p, v, t) curves and tables
• Trafﬁc => Trafﬁc density and Road accidents
• System reliability => Components and Systems Failures
• Diagnosis => Failure detection and monitoring
• Finance => Financial and stock market movement.
Logic and graphical models offer powerful tools to represent logical relation-
ships between systems, functions, actions or concepts and are very used in risk
assessments, e.g.:
• Boolean models => Minimal and disjoint cut-sets, critical paths
• Sequential models => Conditional AND gate
• Fault Trees => Static and Dynamic Fault Trees
• Event Trees
• Decision Trees
• Reliability Block Diagrams
• Graphs => networks, states and transitions
• Mind Mapping.
Qualitative and Descriptive models occupy the major place in decision making
activities, especially when numerical details do not play an essential role or may
muddle up the decision making process. In sever crisis situations, decision makers
need only to construct a synthetic view containing only a reduced number of the
most vital/strategic parameters to be considered
In Fig. 1, we borrow from [3] the Flood Risk Matrix with a slight modiﬁcation,
as an example of a qualitative-descriptive tools for risk assessment.
The grid shown in Fig. 1 is certainly based on a numerical modelling and
assessment. But the ﬁnal representation of the assessment is given in a qualitative
model. The qualitative presentation is synthetic and allows decision makers to grasp
the most pertinent information about a given crisis situation.
Certainly, one can’t perform algebric operations using qualitative information, in
a direct manner.
Having identiﬁed the types of models, we should proceed to the identiﬁcation of
the basic elements used in describing crisis scenarios.
HI High (> 1/10)
ME Medium (< 1/10)
LO Low (< 1/100)








Fig. 1 Flood risk matrix and its color equivalence
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2.2 Scenarios’ Basic Elements
In order to model, simulate and analyze scenarios of disruptions, one should con-
sider the following elements: the threat action, the CIs’ reactions and the
consequences.
Threat can be identiﬁed and speciﬁed by their magnitude and their occurrence
likelihood (probability and/or frequency).
The critical infrastructures are described through their vulnerability to the threat
action, their mutual dependency and the CIs’ disruptions cascading modes and
mechanisms.
The consequences describe the impacts of the threat and the CIs disruptions on
their environment. Impacts can be of different order: citizen safety, society security,
societal moral state, organizational chains rupture, ﬁnancial losses, assets damage
and risk of governance loss of continuity.
The coverage of the above mentioned topics is the ultimate goal of the MS&A
activities even if the state-of-the-art in MS&A does not cover satisfactory all three
topics: threat, CIs disruption and consequences.
2.3 Identiﬁcation and Speciﬁcation of Threats
and Consequences
Threat identiﬁcation and characterization is a ﬁrst act in any crisis scenario MS&A
process. The identiﬁcation and characterization of threats should necessarily be
based on the use of the most appropriate security metrics.
A threats is generally an initiating event that ignites a crisis scenario. Threats are
then identiﬁed according to their belongings: nature actions, systems disruption
and/or man malicious actions. Threats belonging to the category of nature actions
are such as: floods, quakes, extreme temperature conditions, hurricanes, tornados,
tsunamis etc.… The crisis initiating event can also be originated from industrial
systemic disruptions. Industrial systemic disruptions are such as: oil spell accidents,
electrical power plants accidents, road (/air/maritime) trafﬁc accidents, chemical and
processing plants accidents, power or communication networks’ disruptions,
ﬁnancial stock market collapse, human errors etc.… The set of malicious actions
covers: criminal actions, vandalism, terrorist actions, etc.…
Once the threat is identiﬁed, CIP engineers, end-users and crisis mangers pro-
ceed to threat speciﬁcation. A threat is ideally speciﬁed by two ﬁgures: its likeli-
hood and its magnitude/strength.
Formally speaking, “likelihood” is a probabilistic measure and can be given in
two different metrics: the occurrence probability (dimensionless) or the occurrence
rate (per unit time/unit distance/cycle/shock). One can quantify the occurrence
probability and the probability rate if historical data are available and have high
statistical quality. Otherwise, one uses qualitative metrics such as: certain, highly
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probable, probable or rare to qualify occurrence probabilities; and high, moderate or
low to describe the occurrence rates. The numbers of considered levels depends on
the application type.
The threats are also speciﬁed by their magnitudes/strength, such as: the mag-
nitude of an earthquake, the quantity of the rain, the amount of released radioactive
substances, the speed of the wind, the rate of water level increase in a flooding river,
etc.
Very often, one may uses the term “intensity” to specify threats. One says “an
earth quake with high intensity. It causes the death of some hundreds of victims and
some thousands of displaced persons”.
Using the term “intensity”, people refer rather to the impact of the threats and the
associated CIs’ disruptions. In our methodology, we keep the term “intensity” to
measure the consequences of the impact of the threats and the corresponding CIs’
disruptions on their environment.
Similar to the double use of metrics (quantitative/qualitative) in specifying the
threats, engineers and crisis managers use both kind of metrics
(quantitative/qualitative) to specify the consequences (impact) of a given crisis.
Consequences can then be measured using different types of natural metrics:
number of injuries, fatalities, evacuated persons, destroyed buildings, inaccessible
roads, loss of services (transport/water/communication/heating/electricity) and
ultimately loss of governance/public unrests.
Once one identiﬁed and speciﬁed the threat, one still need to know how to model
and simulate them.
2.4 Modelling and Simulation of Threats and Consequences
There are two ways for modelling threats and consequences:
• Probabilistic: if data allow, one can develop probabilistic models describing
either the occurrence probability functions and/or the occurrence probability
density functions. The most commonly used probability density functions are:
uniform, exponential, gamma, Gumbel, Gaussian, Weibull …
• Conditional: given a well-deﬁned threat, one determines the corresponding CIs’
disruptions and consequences.
Considering one way or the other, analysts should subsequently proceed to the
assessment of the disruptions cascade corresponding to the threat that has been
identiﬁed and speciﬁed, above.
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2.5 Modelling and Simulation of CIs’ Cascade
of Disruptions
Cascade of disruptions is widely treated in literature in a very extensive manner and
a summary of what was published up to 2009 was assembled by Marhavilas et al.
[4].
Generally, we may distinguish two distinct strategies, in MS&A of disruptions’
cascade: (1) the agent-based or federated simulation strategy and the pre-established
sequences list strategy. Many methodologies are based on a mixed approaches.
A detailed screening of the most used or cited methodologies of cascading MS&A
are given in the deliverable D2.1 of the EU-PREDICT project report on the
state-of-the-art [5].
Focusing on the immediate practical target of this chapter, we have chosen to
expose one of the methodologies based on the pre-established scenarios list [6, 7].
But, what is the “cascade of disruptions”?
A crisis scenario is fully described by a given sequence of chronologically
ordered CIs’ disruptions and produces hazardous impacts on its natural, economic
and societal environment.
The CIs implicated in the crisis scenario can be all or in part vulnerable to the
threat and mutually dependent. Subsequently, a robust model—describing the
cascading of disruptions with the time—should integrate vulnerability and
dependency.
2.5.1 Vulnerability
The term “Vulnerability” is used here to describe the dependency between a
well-deﬁned threat and the disruption mode and mechanism of a well-deﬁned CI.
Obviously, a given CI may show different types of disruption modes depending on
the disruption mechanism and the vulnerability of this mechanism to the threat.
Also, a CI does not react to all threats in the same manner.
CI disruptions are fundamentally stochastic processes. They can then occur
independently from threats, as well. The occurrence of disruptions in the absence of
threats will be called “systemic” disruptions. If disruptions are the result of the
occurrence of a threat, they will be called “stressed disruptions”. Stressed disrup-
tions depend on the vulnerability of the CIs to the stressing threat.
Most of the models describe CIs vulnerability to threats using one the following
approaches:
• Qualitative approach; it describes the vulnerability using a qualitative metric
such as: extreme vulnerability, vulnerable, medium, low and not vulnerable.
• Binary approach; it describes vulnerability using a binary function [1, 0]. The
value 1 means that the CI is vulnerable to the threat, i.e., if the threat happens,
the disruption will certainly occur. The value 0 means that the CI is not vul-
nerable to the threat, i.e., if the threat happens, no disruption occurs.
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• Probabilistic approach; it describes in a probabilistic terms the dependency
between the threat and the CI disruption. The vulnerability of a given CI “i” to a
well-deﬁned threat “j” will be described using a vulnerability strain factor “tij”.
The disruption rate kiðjÞ of a given CI “i” under the action of the threat “j” will
then be given by:
kiðjÞ ¼ kiðoÞð1þ tijÞ
where, kiðoÞ is the systemic (unstressed) disruption rate of the CI, “i”, and tij is its
vulnerability strain factor regarding the threat, “j”.
If the CI, “i”, is acted upon by multiple N threats, its effective disruption rate kN;0i






where; kN;0i is the effective disruption rate.
In the presented model, threats act on the same CI, independently. No available
models consider the possibility of a compound damage mechanisms. Considering
independently the vulnerability to each threat gives a conservative estimation of the
effective disruption rate.
The vulnerability strain factor matrix tij represents the vulnerability of a dis-
ruption mode “i” to a given threat “j”. It describes the increase in the disruption
occurrence due to the action of the threat, Table 1.
2.5.2 CI Dependency
The operation of CI depends very often on the operation of some other CIs. One can




Table 1 The CI disruption
dependency matrix
Threats
Th1 Th2 Th3 Th4
Impacted disruption e1 0 0 2.0 0
e2 0.6 0 0 0
e3 0 0.8 0 0
e4 0 0.2 1.0 0
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In order to count for the possible dependency between CIs, all the available
models use a sort of a disruption dependency matrix (D-D matrix). The matrix
elements describe the existing mutual dependency between a given set of identiﬁed
CIs.




The deﬁnition of each category is identical to that mentioned above for
vulnerability.
The dependency of the disruption of a given CI “i” on the disruption of another
CI “j” is described by a factor eij that we will call the CI disruption dependency
strain factor. An academic example of the Disruption Dependency (D-D) matrix is
given in Table 2.
The disruption rate kiðjÞ of a given CI “i” given the disruption of the CI “j” can
then be given as:
kiðjÞ ¼ kiðoÞð1þ eijÞ
where, kiðoÞ is the systemic (unstressed) disruption rate of the CI, “i”, and eij is the
dependency strain factor regarding the disruption of the CI, “j”.
A disruption dependency is called “directional” if the disruption of the CI “j”
impacts on the disruption of the CI “i”, while the inverse is not true. Then, one has
eij[ 0 and eji ¼ 0.
If the disruption dependency is not directional, we will talk about “interdepen-
dency” rather than “dependency” and have, generally, eij 6¼ eji[ 0.
An illustrative example of the independence strain matrix eji is given in Table 2.
If the CI, “i”, is acted upon by multiple disruptions of other M CIs, its effective






where, k0;Mi is the effective disruption rate.
Table 2 The CI disruption
dependency matrix
Impacting disruptions
e1 e2 e3 e4
Impacted disruption e1 0 0 0 0
e2 0.6 0 0 0
e3 0 0.8 0 0
e4 0 0.2 1.0 0
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In the presented model, the disruptions of many CIs act independently on a given
CI. We have not considered the possibility of a compound damage mechanisms.
Considering independently the impact of each other disruption gives a conservative
estimation of the effective disruption rate.
2.5.3 Integrating Vulnerability and Dependency
In a complex case, where there are many disrupted CIs and simultaneously









where N refers to the number of the simultaneous acting threats and M refers to the
number of the already disrupted CIs.
2.6 Cascading of Disruptions
Disruption cascading can be described by the occurrence of some discrete and
independent disruptions ei that happen in a well-speciﬁed order
e1 ! e2 ! e3    ! en½ . The corresponding occurring instants are deﬁned by
t1; t2; t3; . . .; tn½ , where t1\t2\t3\   \tn½ , [7]. Each of these instances
t1; t2; t3; . . .; tn½  has its distribution probability function (pdf), qðtÞ. The ﬁrst dis-
ruption event is e1 and the last is en.












This integral can be solved numerically for most of the pdf qiðtÞ and analytically
if the pdf qiðtÞ is of Poisson type.
The pdf qiðtÞ can be determined if one has a conceptual mathematical model
describing the CI disruption. The probability density function qiðtÞ and the
occurrence rate kN;Mi are correlated. Knowing one of them allows to determine the
other.
Otherwise, the occurrence rate kN;Mi can be determined if we have enough data in
the CI disruption databases. It is one of the reasons why disruption databases and
crisis databases are very important issues for MS&A of CI.
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The databases issue touches the determination of the systemic disruption rates,
the stressed disruption rates, the vulnerability strain factor and the dependency
strain factor.
2.7 The Story Time-Line
The cascade is then build up on the time-line with three distinguished phases: active
threat, CI-disruptions considering vulnerability and dependencies and ﬁnally con-
sequences. However, these three phases are not sequential on the time-line. They
can be overlapping. Although, the CI’s cascade of disruptions is built up of
sequential disruptions, Fig. 2.
3 A Hypothetical Crisis Scenario
The major target of this chapter is to illustrate how the MS&A of the cascade of
disruptions provides critical input data to the decision making and crisis
management.
A hypothetical scenario, but inspired form real, will be considered in the fol-
lowing to illustrate the methodology of simulating and analyzing crisis scenarios.
We recall that one should: identify and specify the thread(s), identify the concerned
CIs, determining their respective vulnerability to the thread(s), specify the CIs’
Fig. 2 A schematic representation of the full story line-time
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mutual dependency, identify the crisis scenario(s) (cascading of disruptions) to be
assessed.
Each identiﬁed cascading of disruptions lead to a pre-identiﬁed set of conse-
quences (hazardous impacts). The likelihood of yielding a given set of conse-
quences is proportional to the likelihood of the occurrence of the corresponding
scenario.
3.1 Crisis Scenario Description
Consider an aging dam, regulates the flow of a river using a large retention lac
behind and has 2 water alarm levels: alarm-level-1 (AL-1) and alarm-level-2
(AL-2).
If the water level attends AL-1 in the retention lac, a nearby water pumping
station starts up automatically to evacuate the water excess to a small emergency
retention area far from the lac. It is a provisional evacuation in order to stabilize the
water at level AL-1 or below.
The pumping station is supplied by electricity from the national grid. In case of
grid supply loss accident, a local supply electrical unit (a large diesel generator) can
be immediately activated.
If the water level in the retention lac attends level AL-2, the risk of losing the
dam’s structure integrity becomes signiﬁcant. A major Crisis is publicly declared
and the population in the area should be evacuated within 24–36 h.
3.2 Identiﬁcation and Speciﬁcation of the Threat
The threat is a combination of an extreme heavy rain and a river flood.
The combination of both threats considered having a strong magnitude on a
magnitude scale compromising 6 levels: catastrophic, extreme, strong, medium, low
and insigniﬁcant.
The vulnerability of the concerned CIs’ disruption will depend on this magnitude
through the vulnerability strain factor t, Table 3.
The number of levels on the magnitude scale and their corresponding numerical
values has no standard rules. It can change in function of the threat and the con-
sidered CIs with their geographical-societal context. Very often, it is deﬁned by
mixing approaches from: experience feedback and expert judgement.
Table 3 Threat magnitude-vulnerability equivalence grille
Catastr. Extreme Strong Medium Low Insigniﬁcant
(1þ t) >10 10–6 6–3 3–2 2–1 1–0
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The levels of magnitude and their equivalence in strain factors, given in Table 3,
are for the academic illustration.
3.3 Identiﬁcation and Speciﬁcation of the CIs and Their
Vulnerability
The hypothetical crisis scenario compromises four CIs each shows a speciﬁc unique
disruption mode. Disruption modes are speciﬁed by their systemic occurrence rates,
k, respectively.
The systemic occurrence of a given disruption mode is a random event. It occurs
whether the threat is active or not and whether the disruption mode is dependent on
other disruption modes or not. Certainly, we consider the case of coherent dis-
ruption modes, i.e., the action of threats and the interdependency on other dis-
ruption modes cant but increases the considered occurrence rate.
Considering the above magnitude-vulnerability equivalence grille, in Table 4,
and supposing that the impact of the threat is similarly moderate on the considered
four disruption modes. The vulnerability strain factor t will be taken equal to 1.5,
i.e., the systemic occurrence rate of each disruption mode will be multiplied by a
factor equal to 2.5.
3.4 Speciﬁcation of the CIs Dependency
The dependency between the four considered disruption modes are given, in
Table 5, below. As one can recognize, both disruption modes d3 and d4 are
moderately dependent on d2. While, the d4 shows also a dependency on d3 dis-
ruption mode.
Table 4 Systemic










ksystemic 1e−4 5e−3 2.5e−2 1.25e−1
Table 5 The dependency
strain factors
Impacting disruptions
d1 d2 d3 d4
Impacted disruption d1 0 0 0 0
d2 0 0 0 0
d3 0 0.8 0 0
d4 0 0.4 0.4 0
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3.5 Deﬁnition of the Cascade of Disruptions
The following cascade of disruptions is identiﬁed as one of the possible scenarios
that may lead to a serious crisis. It is deﬁned by the occurrence of the four speciﬁed
disruption modes in the following order, (d1; d2; d3; d4), while:
• Disruption d1: loss of the electricity supply from the grid to the pumping station.
• Disruption d2: loss of the evacuation capability (loss of the water pumping
station). [It covers the loss of the emergency local electrical supply (a large
diesel unit), the loss of automatic start up system and other systemic mechanical
failure modes of the pumping unite.]
• Disruption d3: loss of the dam structure integrity. [It covers all cracks with sizes
larger than a critical value and/or the full collapse of the structure.]
• Disruption d4: loss of the capability of population evacuation. It covers: the
failure of the population alert systems (media and SMS), the unavailability of
the emergency resources, the loss of accessibility to the evacuation meeting
points and the loss of transportation capabilities. [It includes systemic, humans
and organizational failure modes.]
3.6 Deﬁnition of the Crisis Management Target
The crisis management target is to evacuate at least 99% of the population in the
disaster zone within the interval 24–36 h from the crisis declaration starting
moment.
The crisis starts when the water level in the lac behind the dam reaches the AL-2.
3.7 The Consequence to Mitigate or to Dump
We consider that the crisis is successfully managed if: at least 99% of the concerned
population can be evacuated after 36 h from crisis starting moment.
There is evidently a no-zero risk not to succeed in achieving this target.
The unique hazardous consequence to be considered is “having a non-evacuated
population rate higher than 1% after 36 h from crisis starting moment”.
3.8 Scenario Assessment: Simulation and Analysis
For the sake of our illustrative purpose, we limited our assessment to only two
levels of simulations:
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• Simulation #1: assessing the likelihood of a systemic occurrence of the identi-
ﬁed cascading of disruptions. A systemic occurrence supposes no threat’s
actions and no dependencies. The CIs are called unstressed.
• Simulation #2: one considers the threat’s actions (vulnerability strain factors
non-null) and the dependencies between disruption modes (dependency strain
factors non-null). The CIs are called stressed.
3.8.1 Whey the Unstressed Case?
The unstressed case represents a kind of a background crisis. A crisis that we can
live with, even unhappily. If we do not accept its likelihood level, we should change
the whole system: CIs, operating modes, environment, organization and/or the
acceptable level of likelihood. This background crisis serves as a referential to
assess the likelihood of the crisis when the CIs are stressed by the action of the
crisis active vectors.
Again and for the sake of our illustrative purpose, the likelihood of the crisis in
both situations (stressed and unstressed) is assessed using only metrics vectors: the
occurrence probabilities and the occurrence rates.
The time proﬁles of the occurrence probability and of the occurrence rates are
assessed over a period of time equal to 80 h starting from the moment when the
water level behind the dam attends the alarm-level-2. We use the time interval to
reach 90% of the asymptotic occurrence probability as a characteristic ﬁgure. The
90% of the asymptotic occurrence probability will be called the reduced asymptotic
probability (RAP) and the time to attend it is called TTA-RAP. Theoretically, the
asymptotic values are attended when t !1 which is not a practical measure in
taking decisions.
Regarding the occurrence rates, we use the most probable value of the occur-




the unstressed (blue) and
stressed (red) CIs
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3.8.2 Unstressed Case
The CIs are not vulnerable to the threat and the CIs’ are not dependent. The
likelihood of this cascade of disruptions is the following:
• The occurrence probability of the cascade is time dependent. It attends the RAP
value of 3.15e−6 after 46 h, Fig. 3.
• The occurrence rate of the cascade is also a time dependent function. It attends
its MPR value 1.13e−7 after 21 h, Fig. 4.
The systemic occurrence of this cascade of disruptions may result inacceptable
consequences. Therefore the crisis managers would be interested in identifying the
likelihood of the situation and its evolution with the time. Assessing this
risk-background is useful in measuring the “time criticality” for deciding and acting
during the crisis, as will be explained in the following.
Fig. 4 Occurrence rate
time-proﬁle for the unstressed
(blue) and stressed (red) CIs
Table 6 The classiﬁcation of the criticality according to the occurrence rate
Table 7 The occurrence probability and the occurrence rate characteristics
As. prob. RAP TTA. RAP (h) MPR TTA MPR (h)
Case #0 3.46e−6 3.11e−6 44 1.13e−7 20
Case #4 9.25e−6 8.32e−6 17 8.00e−7 7.8
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Given that the most probable value of the cascade occurrence rate, the back-
ground risk-noise, is about 107 and occurs around 21 h, one may propose the
following classiﬁcation based on three classes, Tables 6 and 7:
• Class 3—high: the occurrence arte is almost one decade around the most
probable value of the noise risk [>10−7]. This is the case between 4 and 60 h
from the start of the active phase of the threat.
• Class 2—medium: the occurrence rate is one decade less than in class 1,
108; 107½ . This is the case in two intervals: from 1 to 4 h and from 60 to
85 h.
• Class 1—low: the occurrence rate is one decade below class 2, \108½ . This is
the case before 1 h and after 85 h, in the unstressed case (background-risk).
The unstressed case services in establishing the scale of criticality to be used in
assessing the stressed cases representing crisis situations. Four hypothetical crisis
situations are presented in the following.
3.8.3 Stressed Case
All disruptions d1; d2; d3; d4½  are equally vulnerable to the threat and have vul-
nerability strain factor equal to 1.5. The threat is considered of moderate magnitude
similar to case #2. Dependencies between disruptions are considered. Disruptions
d3 and d4 show dependency on d2 and their dependency stress factors are 0.8 and
0.4, respectively. Disruption d4 show dependency on d3 with a dependency stress
factor equal to 0.4 [e32 ¼ 0:8; e42 ¼ 0:4; e43 ¼ 0:4]. A comparative synthesis is
given in Tables 6 and 7:
• The occurrence probability of the cascade is time dependent. It attends its RAP
value of 8.32e−6 after 17 h, Fig. 3.
• The occurrence rate of the cascade is also a time dependent function. It attends
its MPR value of 8.00e−7 after 7.8 h, Fig. 4.
The occurrence probability is higher than in case #0 (and all the other cases). Its
dynamic behavior is faster than in case #1 but of the same order as the three other
cases.
4 Conclusions
Based on a dynamic model describing the cascade of disruptions, a methodology is
proposed to measure the criticality of time to take decisions and actions in crises
situations.
A methodology is proposed and can briefly be described as based on:
• The vulnerability and the dependency are taken into account in the disruption
occurrence rate.
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• Disruptions are stochastic events. Subsequently, a well-deﬁned sequence of
disruptions may occur even in the absence of the threat action and the depen-
dency between CIs. That is called a systemic cascade and it occurs even when
the corresponding CIs are unstressed.
• The dynamic of systemic cascade is used as a referential dynamic for all pos-
sible stressing modes resulting from the same well-deﬁned cascade of
disruptions.
• The dynamic of a cascade (stressed and unstressed) is characterized by its
occurrence probability and its occurred rate and their time-evolution proﬁle.
• The occurrence probability is used to measure the cascade likelihood.
• The occurrence rate time-proﬁle is a good measure of the cascade dynamic. It is
used to measure the time-criticality regarding decision and action making.
Using exact dynamic models to assess cascade reveals some interesting effects:
• The likelihood of a given cascade does not necessarily increasing with the threat
intensity, in spite of the individual increase of the likelihood of the disruptions
composing the cascade.
• Schematically, higher are the threat magnitude/strength and/or the CIs depen-
dency, faster goes the dynamic of the cascade.
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